KPGM

The Myth of Brotherhood and the Reality of Nations

The animosity between two peoples is often described as “a destiny from antiquity.” However, a look at history reveals that today's animosity is not an ancient fraternal curse, but rather a political construct forged in the relatively recent past.

Abstract

This paper examines the animosity between Israel and Iran across three layers. First, it scrutinizes how the commonly cited mythical narrative of “the conflict between the descendants of Jacob and Ishmael” diverges from actual genealogies. Second, it confirms, through biblical memory, that ancient Persia and the Jewish community enjoyed a rather amicable relationship. Third, it analyzes how the de facto alliance of the mid-20th century abruptly reversed into animosity, with the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution serving as the turning point. In conclusion, this paper argues that the current animosity is not a religious destiny but a construct shaped by the ideologies and geopolitics of modern states.

I. Introduction — The Illusion of “Ancient Hatred”

When explaining the confrontation between Israel and Iran, people often trace it back thousands of years. The narrative suggests that the fraternal discord between Abraham’s two sons, Isaac and Ishmael, has persisted to this day. While intuitive, this narrative is inaccurate. It oversimplifies complex modern politics into the language of myth, simultaneously portraying the conflict as “inevitable fate” and thus stifling the imagination for reconciliation.

This essay begins by deconstructing that familiar narrative. First, it corrects the factual inaccuracies of the genealogy, and then it traces how actual history has diverged significantly from that narrative.

II. The Confusion of Two Genealogies — Ishmael (Arab) and Persia (Iran) Are Different

The first point to clarify is that Iranians are not descendants of Ishmael. In both Jewish and Islamic traditions, Ishmael is generally spoken of as the ancestor of the Arab peoples. However, the Persians, who constitute the majority of Iranians, are not Semitic Arabs but rather an Aryan people belonging to the Indo-European language family. In terms of language (Persian), culture, and self-identity, Iran has consistently distinguished itself from the Arab world.

Therefore, superimposing the framework of “the conflict between the descendants of Jacob (Israel) and Ishmael (Arab)” onto Iran is a categorical confusion. The conflict between Israel and Arab states (including the Palestinian issue) and the conflict between Israel and Iran differ significantly in origin and nature. While the former is deeply intertwined with issues of territory and national self-determination, the latter largely intensified in the late 20th century amidst ideological competition and regional hegemonic rivalries.

III. Persia in Biblical Memory — Not an Enemy, but a Liberator

Interestingly, in ancient memory, Persia appears not as an enemy but as a liberator for the Jewish people. The figure who ended the Babylonian exile was Cyrus II, the king of Persia. He permitted the exiled Jews to return to their homeland and rebuild the temple, an event recorded as a decisive turning point in Jewish history.

Cyrus is remembered not merely as a conqueror, but as a ruler who respected the religion and customs of conquered peoples. Jewish tradition portrays him as an exceptionally benevolent foreign monarch.

The setting for the Book of Esther is also the Persian Empire. In this narrative, where crisis and salvation intersect, the axis of conflict was not “Persia versus Judah,” but rather internal imperial intrigue and its overcoming. In short, in ancient memory, Persia was not an archenemy of Israel. This is the first reason why today’s animosity cannot be explained as “hatred from time immemorial.”

IV. Modern Honeymoon — The Pahlavi Dynasty and the ‘Periphery Alliance’ (1948–1979)

An even more decisive fact is that, only two generations ago, Israel and Iran were virtually close allies. After the establishment of Israel in 1948, Iran under the Pahlavi dynasty effectively recognized Israel and collaborated closely.

The background for this was Israel’s so-called “periphery doctrine” strategy. Surrounded by hostile Arab states, Israel sought to break through the encirclement by forging alliances with non-Arab nations on the outer ring of the Arab world — such as Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia. Iran, which distanced itself from the Arab world through its Persian identity, was a suitable partner for this conception.

The cooperation was concrete: oil supply, exchanges between intelligence agencies, and military and technical cooperation took place. Both nations were wary of Soviet expansion and radical Arab nationalism, and this shared perception of threat bound them together. From the perspective of this period, today’s animosity is not “ancient” but rather a “recent reversal.”

V. The Moment of Rupture — The 1979 Revolution and the Reversal of Ideology

The turning point was the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution. The new regime that replaced the fallen Pahlavi monarchy completely overturned the previous regime’s pro-Western and pro-Israel stance. Hostility towards Zionism and solidarity with Palestine became core ideologies of the new system, and all official relations with Israel were severed.

It is noteworthy that this rupture was driven not by ancient ethnic grievances but by the new political theology espoused by the revolution. As the state's self-definition changed, the relationship between the two countries, once situated in the same geopolitical coordinates, flipped from alliance to animosity. This was not the result of a "fraternal curse," but a consequence of ideological choice.

VI. The Structuring of Animosity — Nuclear, Proxy Wars, and Apocalyptic Rhetoric

Since 1979, the animosity has become increasingly structured over time. This includes tensions surrounding nuclear development, the dynamics of proxy wars through various regional actors, and the apocalyptic and existential rhetoric mobilized by both sides. Each began to define the other not as a mere competitor, but as an existential enemy threatening their survival, and this definition itself reinforced the animosity in a self-fulfilling manner.

Here, mythical narratives are invoked retrospectively. That is, animosity arises first, and then the language of fraternal conflict is drawn upon to justify that animosity as “a destiny from time immemorial.” It is not that myth created the conflict, but that the conflict demanded myth.

VII. Conclusion — Myth is Not Destiny

What this paper aimed to show is simple: the animosity between Israel and Iran is not a fraternal curse predestined from antiquity, but a relatively recent construct born of the ideology and geopolitics of modern states. Genealogically, the two peoples are not even the "brothers" commonly referred to, and historically, they shared long periods of amity and cooperation.

This fact offers a small but significant basis for hope. An animosity that is constructed can, in principle, be deconstructed. Only by stripping away the mythical language that seals conflict as "destiny" and confronting its historical contingency can the imagination for reconciliation be opened. In the Anthropocene, the work of asking about holistic restoration (통전적 회복) between humans can begin precisely by reopening these sealed myths.